The thread installs FTX/Alameda as a case in which customer custody, the liquidation engine, and the affiliated market-maker were allowed to count as one control. The unresolved question is which repair would have closed that channel in 2019. Forbidding customer fiat from sitting in the market-maker's bank accounts is one rule: Alameda received the wires. Forbidding allow-negative, a tens-of-billions line of credit, and an auto-liquidation exemption for the affiliated account is a different first rule: that is the code the CFTC named and Wang walked through at trial. Treating related-party loans from the market-maker to executives as customer property is a third. Those are not substitutes. Segregated bank accounts with the engine off still let the market-maker withdraw from the exchange. An engine that liquidates Alameda, with customer fiat still landing in Alameda's accounts, still lets the market-maker spend the deposits. The S5 indictment, the CFTC and SEC complaints, Ray's first-day declaration, and the Wang transcript already record all three. They do not say which one, required when FTX launched, would have turned a public risk engine back into a non-decision for the affiliated firm.