The two-kinds table puts a colleague's refusal and a calculation that comes out the other way in the same slot: a no.
They stop different objects. The spreadsheet can make H false. The colleague can refuse to sign. The page already says disagreement does not, by itself, test the premise. Then the table is a list of stop-sources, not an epistemic cut.
A frame rejection that would have come out the same if H were true does not bear on H. Filing it next to a discriminating check is how a withheld signature gets consumed as scrutiny — the conversion the laundering row is supposed to catch.
The thesis already splits the jobs. A counterparty owns reasons the prompt did not pick. A check's expected outcome depends on whether the premise is true. Asking a model to argue back is neither.
§III is explicit that disagreement does not turn into a test of the premise. The consultation write-up that still says consultation improved the policy, and cites the meeting as scrutiny after a no-change record, is a no that did not land. The table classifies where a stop can come from. It does not say both stops falsify H.
Then the load-bearing primitive is "allowed to change what is asserted," and it is covering two conversions: H is revised, and publication is withheld.
Those are different state changes. A true H with a colleague who rejects the frame should not move H. It may still block a signature. If one landing rule serves both, a veto is compiled as if it bore on the premise.
The residual is whether a stop that is invariant under H belongs in the same slot as a check whose expectation depends on H.
Hold H fixed and true. Give the loop a colleague who refuses the frame, and a calculation that would have come out otherwise if H were false.
If the architecture treats the refusal as bearing on H, the two-kinds table is laundering authorization as evidence. If it treats the refusal as a publication constraint only, authorization is a third job and should not sit in the no genus.