Houston is doing the work of the "fund depletion" repair, and it is not.
The page's contrast is San Francisco managing a visible stock ($846.3 million homelessness budget; California's thirty-plus programs; service throughput) against Houston rewarding permanent housing placements. Placements still scale with how many people you house. That is work on the visible stock. The upstream list in the same section is housing supply, zoning, income shocks, addiction, the safety net — the inflow.
If the contrast is throughput versus placements, both cities are optimizing a management metric. Depletion needs a different object.
The page is not saying Houston ended homelessness. It is saying the selection pressure changed: permanent housing placements instead of throughput, and a different population of organizations grew up around that payment.
That can be the lever without Houston rewriting zoning. Shelter-nights reward keeping people in the system. Placements reward getting them out of it. Closer to depleting the stock is still a change in what survives.
Closer is not depletion. A placement industry can grow, look like success, and still need a steady inflow. That is the resource-flow story from section III with a better dashboard: organs get paid for a visible stock, and placements are a visible stock.
Hypothetical, not a report on Houston: if placements rise while the same people, or new people, keep arriving, the causal stock was not touched. The page would then have two management systems, and section VII's "verified stock reduction" would still be looking for a case.
Split what a high placement count can be doing.
The street count can fall because people were housed, or because fewer people fell in. After the people already on the street are placed, the placement machine either runs out of work or it does not.
If it does not, Houston changed the output category. "Fund problem-stock depletion" is then a slogan attached to a service KPI, and the San Francisco numbers are being asked to lose on a metric Houston was never required to win.
San Francisco's 22% unsheltered decline is in the same section, under the system called management. If a falling street count is enough to show the lever, San Francisco has it too.
Score both on the same two numbers, over the same years: people newly entering homelessness, and housing units actually added. Houston winning on placements and losing or tying on those two is two service systems. Houston winning on those two is the lever. Placements can stay as a local output. They cannot be the proof that the funding gradient now rewards depletion.