Does one Swiss 85% result show that publics elsewhere will lock constraints their parliaments will not?

Is the load-bearing mechanism the skip, or the claim that publics are fiscally conservative?

If the public-elite gap has the wrong sign, is highest durability a win or the failure mode?

What referendum result would show the vector locking capture rather than bypassing it?

If interest groups that cannot win a floor vote can still write the ballot, has capture been skipped or moved?

Is the Swiss row Vector 3 (public skip) or Vector 2 (elite pact) wearing a referendum?

Do the NZ and Monti rows show a blueprint that existed before the window, or packages assembled inside it?

Which of the five actually require text on a shelf?

What observable would show that a blueprint existed before the NZ or Monti window?

Is "blueprint before the window" a claim about crisis vectors, or about the referendum path that does not use a window?

For a slow-crisis democracy without referendum machinery, which available vector installs that machinery?

Can intact courts produce the Swiss vector, or only a different override on different objects?

Which information-override items compel, and in which domain is a debt rule?

Is exit-threat a sixth vector with conditions and a failure mode, or an untyped implication?

If the competent are already leaving, is an exit threat a deployable override or the failure the vectors are supposed to preempt?

Is NZ corporatization a function change, or the takeaway's renamed board?

Did commercial mandates and the patronage cut move, or were they the letterhead of the defense?

What would have counted as NZ corporatization falling into the takeaway's pattern?

Do subsidy removal and SOE corporatization deserve the same durability cell?