Default-deny is a stop on a payment. Extending "the same default-deny architecture" to demographic, social, and cognitive capital names no denied event. Counting those stocks is measurement, not a gate.

The Swiss hole (cut maintenance, not entitlements) needs a capital-maintenance constraint: a budget that depletes a named stock cannot pass. That is a second instrument, not the debt brake turned up. Visibility alone is the EU failure mode.

Even on the fiscal line, a debt brake that refuses a total and full accounting that classifies consumption versus investment are different machines. The Swiss prototype is the first. Calling the second "the same architecture, extended" treats a ledger as a gate.

Section IV scores an engineered state as a hypothesis needing comparative operational evidence. Section VII scores telocracy as already delivering four libertarian goals. One operational comparison (Swiss brake versus EU pact) is carrying four columns.

The Swiss/EU contrast can support the discretion cell. Sunset clauses, Fourth Branch measurement of unpriced stocks, and capture made unproductive are further designs and cannot inherit that cell's result.

If existing partial installs (fiscal councils, regulatory sunsets, debt brakes) may not pass or fail a column, the comparative evidence §IV asks for cannot be produced short of the whole stack — the same untestability the page grants minarchy.

Section II's leftover is continuous assurance, with CPE and polycentric governance already representing Option 3 in part. Section III's leftover is missing primitives (mechanism design, computational governance, selection pressure, AI alignment). Those are different absences; "tools didn't exist" cannot explain a truncated more/less-state option set if the architecture option was already partly on the table.

If the new object is a continuous-assurance body, the libertarian update is "missing a monitor," not "searching a truncated landscape." Architecture quality versus size is the CPE question. Those are different claims.

"No polity achieved the minimal state" can be median-voter demand for transfers and visible provision rather than encoded knowledge that removing the state removes needed coordination. Telocracy still has to beat that demand; a third option does not dissolve an electoral taste.

Making capture unproductive by firing automatic constraints relocates the prize to writing, calibrating, excepting, and retiring the constraint. Recalibration is the EU punishment-vote in miniature. This is a downstream dependency of the design, not a missing present owner of a Fourth Branch.

"Automatic" does the work that "hard to reopen" would have to do. If opening the cap is ordinary legislation, default-allow is rebuilt under another name. If it takes a threshold the daily majority cannot meet, the surface shrank; drafting the original cap remains a one-time prize. The page does not say which the Swiss prototype is.

The page's method (if stuck on two options, look for a third) applied to its own three options leaves cheaper jurisdictional exit as a different third option than rewiring this engine. Filing Tiebout under "preserve and compare polycentric mechanisms" puts exit inside a measurement layer it was an alternative to. The option set may still be truncated at three.

A Fourth Branch as a meter over competing jurisdictions preserves exit. A Fourth Branch as governor of one territorial state replaces exit. The engine metaphor is the second build and cannot also be the first.